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Fiscal decentralisation represents the transfer of resources from higher to 
lower levels of government usually accompanied by an enhancement in responsi-
bilities and functions of sub- national governments and greater autonomy in their 
budget making and financial decisions. The rising demand generally for 
decentralisation in developing countries in recent years is a consequence of the 
broader processes of globalisation, liberalisation and deregulation. Political 
imperatives for decentralisation have been created by the urge for more effective 
democratisation and the need to bring governments closer to the people for greater 
accountability and better articulation of their needs and preferences.  In a number of 
countries, including Pakistan, the failure of central or state/provincial governments to 
adequately capture local preferences and provide basic services have strengthened 
the case for use of local governments as delivery agents, such that the production and 
distribution of services is carried down to the lowest unit of government capable of 
capturing the associated costs and benefits. 
However, there are well defined pros and cons of decentralisation.  These are 
aptly summarised in the World Development Report  (1997) as follows: 
‘Decentralisation offers the chance to match public services more closely 
with local demands and preferences and to build more responsive and 
accountable government from below.  But decentralisation also has its 
pitfalls, including the possibility of increased disparity across regions, loss 
of macroeconomic stability and institutional capture by local factions, 
especially in highly unequal societies.’ 
The objective of this paper is to identify the major issues of fiscal 
decentralisation which arise in the context of the devolution plan announced by the 
National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB).  The paper is essentially exploratory and not 
definitive in character and seeks primarily to lay down the parameters of the agenda 
of the program for fiscal decentralisation which will have to be a necessary 
concomitant of the transfer of functions from provincial to local governments as 
proposed in the devolution plan. 
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The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 provides a conceptual framework 
for looking at issues related to fiscal decentralisation.  Section 3 describes the broad 
policy statements on fiscal decentralisation contained in the devolution plan 
announced by NRB.  Section 4 discusses the proposed allocation of functions to 
local governments (all tiers combined) and derives the implications for enhancement 
in the size of their budgets and resource requirements.  Section 5 quantifies the 
resulting vertical imbalance among different levels of government and estimates the 
resource gap of local governments which will have to be filled either by 
enhancement in local fiscal powers or through larger transfers from higher levels of 
government. 
Section 6 highlights the general principles for assignment of taxes to different 
levels of government.  Key issues in tax assignment are identified and discussed and 
different alternatives suggested for allocation of fiscal powers, especially between 
provincial and local governments.  Section 7 discusses revenue sharing arrangements 
between provincial and local governments and focuses on issues related to the 
coverage, degree of sharing and formula for allocation of revenues among local 
governments.  Section 8 describes the pros and cons of various types of grant 
schemes and the different options that are available for financing of services through 
grants.  An important issue taken up in this section is the design of fiscal equalisation 
transfers to compensate for the lack of taxable capacity in the relatively backward 
districts of the country.  Section 9 deals with the issues of borrowing powers of 
different levels of government.  Section 10 profiles the alternative schemes that are 
available for achieving fiscal decentralisation to local governments in Pakistan which 
emerge from the analysis in the earlier sections.  Section 11 highlights the resulting 
implications for the terms of reference of the Provincial Finance Commissions.   
Finally, in Section 12 are presented the key conclusions. 
 
2. FRAMEWORK FOR FISCAL DECENTRALISATION 
We focus primarily on the framework for fiscal decentralisation to local 
governments.  It is, of course, possible that the government is also contemplating 
devolution from the federal to provincial levels.  The methodological framework for 
analysing this type of fiscal decentralisation is essentially the same although weights 
attached to different components of the program may differ. 
The key parameters of fiscal decentralisation are presented in Chart 1. The 
first decision to be taken is which additional functions are to be allocated to local 
governments over and above their existing functions.  It appears that some of the 
functions proposed to be transferred to local governments in the NRB devolution 
plan are already contained in their list of functions, like primary education, 
agricultural development, rural development, social welfare and community 
development, etc. (see Table 1).  Historically, local governments have been unable to 
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adequate institutional capacity.  But the devolution plan goes further and allocates a 
large number of new functions which have hitherto been outside the domain of local 
governments.  This includes services like information technology, commerce and 
industry, law and magistracy, etc. 
The primary task of fiscal decentralisation is to organise the financing of the 
expanded list of functions.  In this connection, the first decision to be taken relates to 
the degree of direct financing through own tax revenues and user charges levied by Devolution and Fiscal Decentralisation 
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local governments.  This is a key determinant of the extent of fiscal autonomy that 
local governments will enjoy in their budgeting decisions.  Mobilisation of revenues 
through own sources will require a clear statement of what fiscal powers have been 
made available to local governments and the policy on the extent of cost recovery 
through user charges. 
If local resource mobilisation turns out to be inadequate in financing target 
levels of expenditure (either based on existing or certain minimum standards of 
service provision) then a system of inter-governmental transfers will have to be put 
in place to support the program of fiscal decentralisation.  These transfers could be in 
the nature of sharing in revenues of higher levels of government, grants or 
borrowings.  A key decision is the distribution of transfers among these three types 
of transfers. 
 
3. FISCAL DECENTRALISATION IN THE DEVOLUTION PLAN 
The devolution plan does include some broad statements highlighting the 
overall philosophy with regard to fiscal decentralisation.  Perhaps, the most succinct 
statement is in paragraph 3.3.5.1 of the section on distribution of resources of the 
report on Local Government prepared by the NRB, as follows: 
‘Empowerment, decentralisation and deconcentration cannot be achieved 
without a significant redistribution of resources. Fiscal federalism must 
extend to the district level that will have its own taxing capacity and other 
independent sources of revenue, in addition to receiving funds from 
provincial and federal transfers and grants.  The mechanisms for transfers 
and grants are to be approved by political authorities. They should be 
transparent, non-discretional and equitable.  The latter includes 
equalisation criteria through which poorer districts receive more resources 
than those with greater resources.’ 
Therefore, the devolution plan clearly recognises the need for a measure of 
fiscal autonomy of local governments through the granting and exploitation of 
expanded fiscal powers.  However, it accepts that locally generated resources will 
not be adequate given the wide range of services allocated and recognises the need 
for transfers and grants.  It is significant that the NRB plan has built in a provision 
for federal transfers also to local governments.  Moreover, the plan emphasises the 
need for a system of transparent and formula-based transfers, as opposed to 
discretionary grants. Given one of the hazards of fiscal decentralisation of growing 
regional disparities, due to differences in taxable capacity, the devolution plan rightly 
recognises the need for establishing an explicit scheme of fiscal equalisation 
transfers. Pasha and Pasha 
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The devolution plan goes on to say in paragraph 3.3.5.3: 
‘...The creation of district governments will necessitate the creation of fiscal 
transfer mechanisms from the provinces to the districts.  This is envisaged 
through the creation of a Provincial Finance Commission which will create 
a formula based system for provincial finance awards.’ 
The devolution plan envisages the setting of a Provincial Finance Commission 
(PFC) in each province to decide on the nature of fiscal relations between provincial 
and local governments. This body is expected to play a similar role as the National 
Finance Commission (NFC), which is constitutionally mandated (as per clause 160) 
to decide on the distribution of revenues between the federation and the provinces, 
including the distribution from net proceeds of federal taxes, the making of grants-in-
aid by the federal government to the provincial governments, the exercise by the 
federal government and the provincial governments of the borrowing powers 
conferred by the constitution, and any other matter related to finance referred to the 
Commission by the government.  It is also significant to note that the devolution plan 
envisages transfers from the provincial to the district governments only.  Lower 
levels of local government like the tehsil councils and union councils will receive 
whatever funds are required to execute their functions from the district government 
and not directly from the provincial government. 
With regard to the finance system, the devolution plan says in paragraph 
5.1.2: 
‘Currently the provincial governments spend funds at the district level 
through the provincial departments. With the advent of the new local 
government administrative system many departments and functions 
previously conducted by the provincial departments will now be carried out 
at the district level.  Therefore, funds being spent through these provincial 
line departments as well as those being spent at the divisional level will be 
transferred to the district level.  The transfer and grant system has been 
weak. There is no formula for distribution of funds to districts and 
provincial budgets do not specify district expenditures.’ 
This paragraph makes the important observation that the programme of fiscal 
decentralisation to local governments will effectively not require additional 
resources.  Provincial expenditures on services will essentially be converted into 
local expenditures through appropriate financing arrangements.  Funds will be 
transferred alongwith a transfer of responsibilities. Therefore, the fiscal 
decentralisation program should have no immediate consequences on the fiscal 
deficit combined of all levels of government. 
However, there is a danger that the statement made in the above paragraph by 
the NRB can be interpreted as being supportive of specific purpose transfers rather Devolution and Fiscal Decentralisation 
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than general or block grants. If budgets at the district level of provincial line 
departments are essentially going to become budgets of the corresponding 
departments of the newly constituted district governments, then in the short run there 
will be little or no change in expenditure priorities.  This will defeat one of the basic 
objectives of the devolution plan which is to take government nearer to the people, 
such that local needs and preferences can be translated into changes in expenditure 
priorities. 
With regard to sources of finance, paragraph 5.1.6. of the devolution plan 
says: 
‘The three tiers of local government have a tax collection machinery at 
their disposal and the schedule of local taxes for union and district levels.  
The local governments can also charge user fees.  Under the district and 
local government reform, access to sources of revenue will be 
operationalised through: 
 1.  Decentralisation of provincial and divisional assets of departments. 
 2.  Local resource mobilisation through two sources: (a) citizen community 
boards for their own projects and (b) the incentive framework of district 
funds to support these projects. 
 3.  To ensure district financial autonomy, a provincial fiscal transfer 
mechanism based on the following factors will be developed. 
  • Fiscal needs judged by conditions of the area; 
  • fiscal equalisation judged by fiscal capacity; 
  • fiscal effort; and 
  • function specific transfers linked to minimum standards. 
 4.  In addition to the already provided schedule of taxes, the district assembly 
will also be empowered to create new taxes for specific purposes such as 
education and health. 
 5.  Eventually, there will be need for financial intermediation.  The 
development of this system requires credit rating agencies, accounts and 
audit, and legal and regulatory frameworks.  Achieving this is the medium 
term goal of the local government reform. 
 6.  Remunerative projects and other incomes will enhance revenues.’ 
This paragraph contains a number of important provisions.  First, provincial 
and divisional assets of line departments (performing functions that are transferred) 
will be decentralised (that is, handed over) to local governments enabling them to 
collect user charges, wherever possible, on these facilities.  It is significant that only 
assets are being transferred and not liabilities.  This implies that the debt servicing of 
all development loans taken earlier to finance the acquisition of these assets will 
continue to be the responsibility of provincial governments. Pasha and Pasha 
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Second, innovative local financing mechanisms for projects have been 
proposed which include community contributions in cash or in kind organised by the 
citizen community boards with the possibility of some matching contribution from 
district governments. Third, a fiscal equalisation scheme of transfers is proposed to 
be put in place with the size of grants linked inversely to the fiscal capacity of an 
area.  Fourth, as indicated earlier, there is a preference for specific transfers to ensure 
at least a minimum level of service provision. 
Fifth, residual fiscal powers appear to have been granted to district 
governments, revenues from which could be earmarked for specific services.  This 
provision runs the risk of local governments encroaching on the tax bases of higher 
levels of government and leading to a multiplicity of taxes.  Ideally, the range of 
fiscal powers of local governments should be made explicit to avoid these problems.  
Sixth, the proposed financing mechanisms also include a provision for the more 
viable local governments to access to the capital markets, at least in the medium run.  
This is a complex issue and is discussed in a later section of the paper. 
Altogether, the principles enunciated in the devolution plan on fiscal 
decentralisation indicate that the NRB wants to see local governments which are 
financially autonomous to the extent possible, with significant fiscal powers.  But 
there is the realisation that given the large number of functions allocated to district 
governments involving substantial expenditure and the limited revenue generating 
capacity of local taxes a comprehensive and elaborate system of inter-governmental 
transfers will have to be put in place to bridge the resource gap.  The devolution plan 
appears to have an implicit preference for specific transfers to ensure at least a 
minimal level of provision of different services.  Such transfers may run counter, 
however, to the goal of local financial autonomy and limit the scope for change in 
expenditure priorities. 
Further, the plan is also conscious of the danger that fiscal decentralisation 
will exacerbate regional disparities and, therefore, rightly proposes a system of fiscal 
equalisation.  However, fiscal decentralisation in the devolution plan has remained 
essentially confined to a statement of general principles and much more work is 
required to operationalise this program.  This paper represents the first step in this 
regard.  It attempts to lay the groundwork of identifying issues related to 
implementation of the program of fiscal decentralisation which will, of course, 
ultimately have to be resolved by the PFCs. 
 
4. ALLOCATION OF FUNCTIONS 
The devolution plan proposes (in paragraph 4.2.5.2.2) that the district 
administration will consist of 13 departments as follows: 
 1.  Finance, Planning and Budget. 
 2.  Public Works: housing and urban development, rural development, water   
supply and sanitation, energy, roads and other infrastructure. Devolution and Fiscal Decentralisation 
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 3.  Health: standards and programmes, public health, basic and rural health 
units, hospitals, child health and the women’s health sub-department 
(additionally responsible for population planning). 
 4.  Literacy: literacy campaigns, continuing education and vocational 
education 
 5.  Social Development: institutional development, community resource 
development, labour and social security, social welfare, culture and co-
operatives. 
 6.  Information Technology: information technology and district data base. 
 7.  Revenue: land revenue, estate, excise and taxation. 
 8.  Agriculture: food, agriculture, livestock, irrigation and drainage, fisheries 
and forests. 
 9.  Education: elementary education, secondary education (boys), secondary 
education (girls), technical education, colleges and sports. 
 10.  Commerce and Industry: investment, commerce and industry. 
 11.  Law: prosecution, legal functions and legislation. 
 12.  Environment: environmental education, environmental protection. 
 13.  Magistracy: land revenue, estate, excise and taxation. 
The list of sub-departments is generic in nature and will vary in accordance 
with the nature of each district. 
Therefore, virtually all social services and a major component of economic 
and community services, which are currently the responsibility of provincial 
governments, are proposed to be transferred to district governments.  In addition, 
new functions are being created related to literacy, social development, information 
technology and environment, for which full-fledged departments do not currently 
exist at the provincial level. Therefore, as highlighted earlier, what we are witnessing 
in Pakistan is a massive programme of fiscal decentralisation to the local level.  This 
is unprecedented in the history of Pakistan and most other developing countries. 
What implication does this program have on the size of local budgets? 
Currently, a ball park estimate is that local governments in Pakistan, which include 
the urban local councils (metropolitan corporations, municipal corporations, 
municipal committees and town committees) and their rural counterparts (district 
councils) and union councils, collectively are responsible for expenditure (both 
current and development) of about Rs 40 billion. The corresponding budget of the 
four provincial governments combined is about Rs 225 billion.  Therefore, in the 
present dispensation, local governments are small (about one fifths) in size  in 
relation to provincial governments. 
Following the transfer of functions to local governments, as envisaged in the 
devolution plan, local governments will expand considerably while the direct 
expenditure responsibilities of provincial governments will contract significantly.   




Share of Provincial Expenditure at District Level or Below (Four Provinces 
Combined; Current Plus Development Expenditure)1997-98 
(Rs in Billion) 
Service Expenditure 
% Expenditure at 
District Level or Below 
on Functions to be 
Transferred 
Expenditure at District 
Level or Below on 
Functions to be 
Transferred 
A.  General Administration  18.9  20  3.8 
B.  Law and Order  15.0  –  – 
C.  Social Services  57.4  71  40.8 






















Others 2.6  50  1.3 
D.  Economic Services  18.3  64  11.7 
Agriculture 7.2  50  4.3 
Irrigation 8.2  70  5.7 
Others 2.9  60  1.7 
E.  Community Services  19.0  57  10.9 
Highways, Road, etc.  10.4  50  5.2 
Public Health Engg.  3.5  75  2.6 
Others 5.1  60  3.1 
F.  Subsidies  2.8  –  – 
G.  Interest Payments  33.3  –  – 
H.  Others  2.0  –  – 
Total 166.7  40  67.2 
Sources: Provincial Budget Documents. 
 
(both current and development) will stand transferred to local governments. This, 
of course, depends upon the nature of financing arrangements, especially with 
regard to which level of government picks up the salary and allowances of district 
and lower level  staff of provincial line departments, responsibilities of which are 
transferred to local governments.  Ideally, district and lower level personnel should 
be paid out of local budgets.  If close to 40 percent of the existing provincial 
budgets is transferred to local governments following the implementation of the 
devolution plan then expenditures of provincial governments will become 
restricted to costs of general administration, law and order, debt servicing, budgets 
of provincial line departments like works, irrigation, etc., which remain in 
existence with the responsibility of managing and developing trunk (inter-district) 
infrastructure, budgets of regulatory entities (like education boards) and the 
legislative and judicial components. Devolution and Fiscal Decentralisation 
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40 percent of provincial budgets is about Rs 90 billion.  Therefore, with the 
additional functions, local budgets will increase to about Rs 130 billion from the 
present level of approximately Rs 40 billion. On top of this, budgets for new 
departments of literacy, social development, information technology and environ-
ment and costs of the legislative component of local governments will have to be 
provided for. Khan and Sadiq (2000) attempts a quantification of the costs of 
devolution.  Further, it is proposed by NRB that specialised agencies like the 
WASAs and the development authorities will be merged into district governments in 
the large cities. Altogether, it would not be surprising if, after the full-scale 
implementation of the devolution plan, we have local governments which are almost 
four times larger in terms of the size of their budgets than at present.  Clearly, this 
has major implications not only on the required financial resources but also on the 
institutional capacity of local governments.  This will imply, in particular, the need 
for strengthening of budgeting and accounting systems and audit procedures and 
enhancement in the technical capacity to design and execute projects. 
With about 40 percent contraction in expenditures, the combined budget of 
provincial budgets (in terms of direct expenditures) will reduce to about Rs 135 
billion.  This, of course, does not incorporate the increase in expenditure if there is 
also a devolution of functions from the federal to provincial level.  All in all, it can 
be concluded at this stage that the devolution plan will change dramatically the 
relative size of provincial and local governments.  From being about one fifths the 
size of provincial governments, local governments are likely to become almost equal 
or somewhat larger in size, following the execution of the devolution plan.  Given 
this radical change, it is clear that the process of transition will have to be carefully 
managed. 
A variant on the NRB allocation of functions has been presented by Bengali 
(2000) in the previous paper presented at the seminar. On the basis of the application 
of criteria of externality, chargeability and technicity he proposes a somewhat 
truncated number of functions for local governments. As such he keeps the 
responsibilities for higher education, food and agriculture, forestry and fisheries, 
preventive health, industries, labour welfare and social security and industries with 
provincial governments.  This would, therefore, imply less fiscal decentralisation.  In 
the Bengali (2000) proposal the total budget transferred to local governments would 
be about Rs 65 billion as opposed to Rs 90 billion in the NRB plan. Therefore, even 
the truncated proposal involves substantial decentralisation of expenditures. 
The basic difference between the NRB and the Bengali (2000) proposals is 
that the former envisages local governments not only as the primary delivery agent 
for services but also as key players in the regional development process, while the 
latter essentially allocates only the first role to local governments and leaves the 
second role largely with provincial governments.  In both proposals, for a large 
number of functions, the role of provincial governments will be transformed from 
one of direct provision to that of regulation, financing and monitoring. Pasha and Pasha 
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5.  VERTICAL IMBALANCE 
Given the present allocation of taxes and the proposed allocation of 
expenditure functions (alongwith the associated non-tax revenues) by NRB, as 
discussed in the previous section, we are now in a position to quantify the extent of 
vertical imbalance between revenues and current expenditures of the federal, 
provincial and local governments. This indicates the magnitude of transfers required 
from one level of government to the other in order to balance budgets.  Table 3 
indicates that the allocation of taxes is such that the federal government will continue 




Vertical Imbalance among Different Levels of Government Following Transfer 
of Functions to Local Governments as Per Devolution Plan (%) 
Level of Government  Share in Revenues  Share in Current Expenditure  Surplus (+) / Deficit (–) 
Federal 88 70  +18 
Provincial 6  15  –9 
Local 6  15  –9 
All Levels  100  100  0 
Source: Estimated by the authors. 
 
The fundamental implication of the likely vertical imbalance is that either 
there is a massive realignment of fiscal powers or there will continue to be a need for 
large transfers from federal to provincial governments (as per NFC provisions) and, 
in addition, a new system of substantial inter-governmental transfers to local 
governments will need to be put in place.  The issue is whether there should be direct 
transfers from the federal to local governments or whether the transfers should be 
routed through provincial governments.  Our preference is for the latter which is 
likely to be more consistent with the constitutional provisions and enable provincial 
governments to play the necessary role of regulating and monitoring the behaviour of 
local governments. 
Therefore, in an inter-governmental regime where transfers from a higher 
level of government are only to the next lower level of government, federal transfers 
to provincial governments will not only have to cover up the resource gap of the 
latter but also of the local governments. Provincial transfers will then finance the 
resource gap of local governments.  In effect, the federal government will indirectly 
be transferring resources to the local government via provincial governments. 
Table 3 also gives an indication of the required magnitude of transfers.   
Federal transfers to provincial governments will have to be over 20 per cent of 
revenues (tax and non-tax) collected by the federal government.  Provincial transfers 
to local governments will constitute almost 40 per cent of provincial own revenues Devolution and Fiscal Decentralisation 
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and federal transfers to provinces.  On this basis it is possible to quantify the extent 
of dependence of subnational governments on transfers.  It appears that over 60 per 
cent of the current expenditure by provincial and local governments will have to be 
financed by transfers.  If the objective is to eliminate borrowing by subnational 
governments then transfers will have to be even larger to generate sufficiently big 
revenue surpluses to finance the development programs of provincial and local 
governments. 
We turn now to the issues of, first, whether a better strategy is to remove the 
vertical imbalance by realigning substantially the fiscal powers and, in particular, 
increasing the tax assignments to sub-national governments or to bridge the resource 
gap through transfers and, second, what form the transfers should take, with the 
options being revenue sharing or various forms of grants. 
 
6.  TAX ASSIGNMENTS 
The extent of self-reliance of local governments on own sources crucially 
depends on the allocation of fiscal powers.  In addition, there are other benefits from 
enhancement in local fiscal powers.  It becomes possible, in particular, to establish a 
much closer link in the minds of citizens between taxes paid and benefits received.  
This is likely to encourage greater tax payer compliance and promote the 
development of a tax culture.  Further greater self-financing of services essentially 
makes local governments more accountable.  At the margin, if a local government 
wants to provide more or better services than it has to convince local residents to pay 
more for this improvement. However, decentralisation of the tax system has the 
negative implication of increasing the differences in the financial resources among 
local jurisdictions on the basis of divergence in taxable capacity. 
The division of revenue sources among different levels of government 
constitutes the tax assignment problem.  We start by first laying down the principles 
of tax assignment and based on these discuss the resulting allocation of taxes 
between different tiers of government. Two considerations are important in 
determining the extent to which fiscal powers should be decentralised.  First, there 
has to be a link between expenditure and tax assignments so as to match expenditure 
needs with revenue means at different levels of government.  Second, there are 
efficiency considerations with regard to the appropriate level of government for 
collecting a particular tax.  The general principle is that taxes on relatively immobile 
tax bases should be levied by local authorities so as to minimise the excess burden 
associated with taxation.  The objective is to ensure that the costs of provision of 
local public goods are financed primarily by taxes the incidence of which falls on 
local residents. 
Beyond this, taxes on mobile factors of production should be centralised in 
order to maintain uniform tax rates across jurisdictions and prevent distortions in the 
location of economic activity.  Further, progressive redistributive taxes and taxes Pasha and Pasha 
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suitable for economic stabilisation should be centralised.  As far as user charges are 
concerned these can be levied appropriately by all levels of government. 
By and large, efficiency considerations appear more important in assignment 
of taxes among different levels of government in developing countries.  This is 
reinforced by the need for centralised tax administration which can effectively 
collect revenues and avoid fragmentation of the resource mobilisation effort. 
Based on the above principles, the major potential local taxes are presented in 
Table 4.  These include taxes on property, transport, sales, entry / exit, entertainment, 
resources,  production,  transaction  and  sumptuary  taxes.  Taxes on real estate have  
 
Table 4 
Potential Local Taxes and Existing Local Taxes in Pakistan 
Property Related Taxes  Entertainment Taxes 
Tax on Annual Rental Values
*  Tax on Cinemas
* 
Tax on Capital Values  Tax on Dramatic and Theatrical
￿ Shows 
Tax on Transfer of Property
*  Tax on Feasts
* 
Transport Taxes  Tax on Advertisements
* 
Registration and Annual Tax on Non-
Mechanised Transport
*  Head Taxes 
Registration and Annual Tax on Motor 
Vehicles
* 




Taxes on Motor Fuels  Tax on Births and Marriages
* 
Congestion Tolls  Poll Tax 
Taxes on Sales  Resource Taxes 
Single-Stage Retail Sales Tax  Royalties 
Entry/Exit Taxes  Conservation Charges 
Octroi
**  Taxes on ‘Bads’ 
Export Tax
**  Taxes on Motor Fuels 
Sumptuary Taxes  Effluent Charges 
Betting and Gambling Tax  Congestion Tolls 
Tax on Lotteries  Taxes on Animals 
Tax on Race Tracks  Slaughter Tax
* 
Tax on Alcohol  Livestock Trading Tax
* 
  Surcharges 
 Personal  Income  Tax 
 Sales  Tax 
 State/Provincial  Taxes
* 
Sources: Local Government Ordinances. 
Pasha and Ghaus (1995). 
 *Existing local taxes in Pakistan as per the Local Government Ordinances. 
**Included in local fiscal powers, but octroi and zila tax have been abolished in 1998. Devolution and Fiscal Decentralisation 
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valorisation characteristics and can recover costs of public service provision based 
on the increment in property values.  Since road street maintenance is generally a 
local responsibility, transport/motor vehicle taxes are suitable for assignment to local 
governments subject to the condition that the particular vehicles taxed essentially ply 
within a jurisdiction.  If the tax rate is harmonised, single-stage sales tax can be 
levied by any level of government and can provide a broad-based buoyant source of 
revenue for local governments also.  However, the point of taxation should be at the 
retail level to prevent possibilities of ‘tax exporting’.  Taxes on resources and 
entertainment are good local government instruments because of the immobile nature 
of the tax base.  Income tax (both personal and corporate) is a tax on mobile factors 
and is partially levied for redistributive reasons.  Therefore, it is more suitable for 
assignment to the central government. 
A number of issues arise in the context of assignment of taxes.  First, 
overlapping tax bases or tax base sharing between different levels of government 
increases tax payers’ compliance costs and leads to spatial variation in effective 
tax rates, with associated distortions.  For example, in Pakistan, a stamp duty is 
charged by provincial governments on property transactions.  In addition, local 
governments levy a tax on transfer of property.  The consequence is that the 
overall incidence of taxes on property transactions is quite high, retarding the 
development of the property market and leading to a large-scale underdeclaration 
of property values for tax purposes.  This multiplicity of collection agencies 
belonging to different levels of government has also increased compliance costs 
for tax payers. A better arrangement is for establishment of revenue-sharing in one 
tax imposed on property transactions. 
Second, in the case of subnational taxes levied on mobile tax bases problems 
arise due to tax rate competition among different jurisdictions.  Clearly, there has to 
be some degree of autonomy in the fixation of tax rates so that the subnational 
governments can select the optimal level of taxation in line with the preferences of 
their residents.  However, there is the danger that subnational governments may opt 
for too low a tax rate to attract economic activity within their respective jurisdictions.  
This problem has been resolved at the provincial level in Pakistan by harmonisation 
of tax rates although it mitigates against fiscal autonomy. 
Third, in countries like Pakistan characterised by large variations in the level 
of regional development there is the danger of tax exporting.  Given regional 
disparities, especially in industrialisation, relatively advanced regions (where 
industry is concentrated) can export their taxes to residents of consuming states, 
assuming that the burden of the taxes is borne by the consumers.  There was 
evidence of this in the context octroi and zila taxes, which now stand abolished at the 
local level.  The likelihood of tax exporting is one of the justifications for not 
assigning taxes on natural resources to subnational governments. Pasha and Pasha 
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The key questions that arise in the context of local tax assignments in Pakistan 
include the following: What is the current allocation of local taxes in the country?  
Do these conform to the principles enunciated above? 
Local government’s fiscal powers in Pakistan are explicitly mentioned in the 
Local Government Ordinances, promulgated by the four provincial governments in 
the country.  By and large, taxes included in the fiscal powers of local councils in 
Pakistan are in line with the potential local taxes presented in Table 4.  The key 
exclusions are a single-stage retail sales tax and surcharges on personal income tax 
and sales tax. The former remains underdeveloped in Pakistan.  Likewise, piggy 
backing on mobile tax bases like the income tax opens the possibility for shifting 
income to low tax rate jurisdictions away from smaller towns/cities, where the 
disincentive created due to the relatively higher incidence of the tax is not 
outweighed by the large city benefits. As such, there is limited scope of any 
meaningful reassignment of taxes to the local governments in the country. 
With the abolition of octroi/zila tax in 1998 whatever revenue mobilisation 
capacity existed at the local level has been largely eroded.  As such local 
governments now have to almost totally rely on transfers from higher tiers of 
government not only to finance their development activities but also the operations 
and maintenance of existing facilities.  Given the limited scope for reassignment of 
fiscal powers it appears that transfers will increasingly be the backbone of the local 
government finances in the country.  This will tantamount to a big change in local 
fiscal structure. Traditionally, prior to the abolition of octroi/zila tax, local 
governments in Pakistan had largely been self-financing entities. The challenge then 
is how can funds be transferred to local governments without compromising on local 
autonomy?  This issue is discussed in subsequent sections. 
Another issue is the commonality in the provincial and local tax bases.  Five 
potentially key taxes, this is, urban immovable property tax; tax on vehicles; tax on 
transfer of properties; tax on professions; trades and callings; and entertainment tax 
can essentially be levied by both provincial as well as the local governments.  To 
avoid multiplicity of taxation and its concomitant problems discussed earlier, it is 
important that either a tax is handed over exclusively to one level of government or 
one tier of government collects it, subsequently sharing the revenue proceeds with 
the other tier on the basis of some predetermined, transparent revenue-sharing 
formula.  A strong case exists for the handing over of urban immovable property tax 
to local governments, since the tax is levied to finance the provision of local 
services.  The handing over of property tax to local governments will at least partly 
compensate for the loss of fiscal autonomy due to the withdrawal of the powers to 
levy octroi/zila tax in 1998, it will also augment the local fiscal base and the tax can, 
in effect, be developed as a budget-balancing devise. Currently, provincial 
governments are able to extract only about one thirds of the revenue potential of the 
tax at existing statutory rates due primarily to low valuation of annual rental values.  Devolution and Fiscal Decentralisation 
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Since 85 percent of the proceeds of the tax have to be transferred to local 
governments, provincial governments have had little incentive to incur the high 
political costs involved in development of the tax. The other common tax bases can 
form part of the divisible pool of taxes to be shared between the provincial and the 
local governments. 
The next issue relates to the reintroduction of octroi and zila tax since these 
were the largest sources of local revenue.  Their abolition and substitution by grants 
can be considered a major blow to local fiscal autonomy.  However, the abolition of 
both these taxes can be supported on the grounds that they had become a major 
impediment to the development of a national common market and the flow of goods 
within the country.  They were generally regressive in character and imposed higher 
costs of collection and compliance. Moreover, the appointment of private contractors 
for tax collection had led to high levels of corruption.  Also, both taxes had the 
problem of being at least partly exported to other local jurisdictions.  As such, their 
reintroduction cannot be justifiably argued for.  However, from the viewpoint of 
preserving local fiscal autonomy, the revenue foregone should be substituted by a 
mechanism which ensures buoyancy, sustainability, fairness and transparency.   
Therefore, the grant system for substituting revenue from octroi/zila tax should have 
the following features: one, explicit earmarking of a revenue source for financing the 
grant to establish viability and sustainability; and, two, a clear cut formula for 
determination of the size of the grant to each local council to ensure transparency 
and fairness.  The original proposal for the abolition of octroi/zila tax (prepared by 
the Multiplicity of Taxes Committee) incorporated these features.  It was suggested 
that the standard GST rate on goods be enhanced by an amount adequate to cover the 
total cost of octroi/zila tax grants to local governments.  GST was chosen for 
earmarking because of the similarity of the octroi, in particular, to a local sales tax.  
Given the projected GST revenue, this required an increase in the standard rate of  
2.5 percentage points. 
In the area of tax assignment, another issue is the intra-district sharing of 
fiscal powers among the district, tehsil and union councils.  Currently in the Local 
Government Ordinances there is a considerable overlap in the fiscal powers of union 
councils and district/urban local councils.  As such, it is proposed that fiscal powers 
of tehsil and union councils should primarily consist of the ability to levy surcharges 
on taxes of district governments.  This will avoid a multiplicity of small taxes and 
obviate the need for establishment of an elaborate tax collection machinery at the 
lower levels of local government. 
Finally, an issue is one of the degree of regulation of the local tax systems by 
provincial governments.  The current practice is that any change in local tax rates has 
to based on prior approval from provincial governments.  Clearly, this represents a 
major violation of the principle of local fiscal autonomy and will have to be 
abandoned.  But, in view of the possibility of capture of local governments by vested Pasha and Pasha 
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interest groups and the resulting granting of concessions in local taxes, a floor / 
minimum may be prescribed by provincial governments on local tax rates / per capita 
tax collections.  This will also avoid unhealthy tax competition among local 
jurisdictions to attract economic activity.  Further, appropriate incentive mechanisms 
may need to be put in place by provincial governments in the design of grant 
schemes to reward extra fiscal effort or improved expenditure management by 
particular local governments. 
 
7.  REVENUE SHARING ARRANGEMENTS 
We have concluded in the previous section that the scope for reassignment of 
taxes to enhance fiscal powers and the resulting autonomy of local government is 
constrained by the limited revenue-raising capacity of potentially ‘local taxes’ and, 
therefore, reliance will have to be placed on transfers to finance the process of fiscal 
decentralisation to local governments. This, of course, has the consequential 
implication that the goal of financial autonomy of local governments, as reflected in 
the ability to self-finance expenditure, will largely not be realised. The question then 
arises: As emphasised by the NRB how far do we go for the second best option of 
building local fiscal autonomy by establishing revenue sharing arrangements which 
are transparent, formula- driven and fixed for a period of time (say, five years like 
the NFC) by the PFCs (which should ideally be granted constitutional status like the 
NFC)?  The answer to this question is in some sense of fundamental importance in 
determining whether the process of devolution provides a better mechanism for 
articulation of local needs or preferences or not. 
The single most important issue in the context of revenue-sharing 
arrangements is the extent to which such transfers should finance the process of 
fiscal decentralisation to local governments.  At one extreme, if the objective is to 
maximise local autonomy in the absence of local revenue generation of a large 
enough magnitude then the preference is for general transfers, either through revenue 
sharing or block grants.  At the other extreme, if the process of fiscal decentralisation 
is to be regulated and restrictions placed on the behaviour of local governments then 
the PFCs could opt for specific purpose transfers which ensure that expenditure 
priorities do not change dramatically in the short run. 
We highlight the implications of each alternative.  If bulk of the transfers are 
to be in the nature of revenue sharing transfers then the divisible pool of taxes to be 
shared and the share of local governments in this pool will have to be kept 
sufficiently large.  This can only be achieved by the inclusion of transfers to 
provinces from the federal-provincial divisible pool in the provincial-local divisible 
pool alongwith the revenue collected from provincial taxes.  As highlighted in the 
earlier section on vertical imbalance, this would be the way to indirectly route 
through federal support to local governments. In 1999-2000, the former are estimated 
at Rs 123 billion for the four provinces combined as compared to about Rs 22 billion Devolution and Fiscal Decentralisation 
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generated from provincial taxes (which could contract in size somewhat if as 
described in the previous section some provincial taxes are assigned to district 
governments). Therefore, if revenue sharing transfers to local governments are to be 
the principal transfer mechanism then the share of such governments in the expanded 
provincial divisible pool, consisting both of revenues from provincial taxes plus 
federal NFC transfers to provinces, would approach 40 to 45 percent. 
If, however, the revenue sharing by local governments with provincial 
governments is to remain restricted, then the divisible pool will consist of only some 
or all provincial taxes and the job of the PFCs (like the NFC) would be to specify 
which provincial taxes should form part of the divisible pool and what the collective 
share of local governments ought to be in this pool.  Given the fact that in this 
situation the maximum size of the divisible pool will be about Rs 22 billion it is clear 
that the process of fiscal decentralisation would then have to be largely financed by 
various grants. 
Beyond the issue of the size of the divisible pool, we have the issue of what 
formula should be used to allocate funds to individual district governments.  This is 
also likely to be a somewhat contentious issue (as is the case for the NFC with regard 
to the distribution of revenues to individual provinces) and will ultimately have to be 
resolved by the PFCs.  Presently, the NFC has incorporated explicitly only one 
criterion, that is, population, in the revenue sharing formula and proposed special 
grants to the two relatively backward provinces, Balochistan and NWFP, as a 
measure of fiscal equalisation.  The question is whether the PFCs can evolve a more 
complex formula for distribution of revenues to districts based on the use of multiple 
criteria?  If so, what are the potential candidates for use as criteria? 
The present revenue sharing between the provinces and local councils is 
restricted only to the urban immovable property tax with shares of 15 and 85 per cent 
respectively.  Government of Balochistan had proposed a 50:50 share in the motor 
vehicles tax which has probably not yet been implemented.  The basis for sharing is 
collection or the origin of revenues. Therefore, this is one valid criterion which can 
be used in future revenue sharing arrangements, especially if the divisible pool 
remains restricted only to provincial taxes.  However, if the divisible pool is to be 
extended to include federal divisible pool transfers to the provinces then the 
allocation of funds to districts on the basis of collection of federal taxes could 
become an extremely complicated exercise.  This is partly the reason why this 
criterion has not been used for allocating funds to provinces from the federal 
divisible pool.  Perhaps, the recently reconstituted NFC will begin deliberating on 
the feasibility of including this criterion in the revenue sharing formula for some or 
all the taxes in the federal divisible pool. 
Why is the inclusion of the criterion of collection either at the provincial or 
local level so difficult,  even if it is accepted as a legitimate criterion?  The problem 
is essentially one of apportionment. This is particularly manifest in the case of Pasha and Pasha 
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federal taxes which are levied at the import stage like customs duties, general sales 
tax and presumptive income tax on imports.  In such cases while collection is largely 
from Karachi port and the dry ports the effective burden of these taxes falls on all 
jurisdictions where imported goods are consumed.  Therefore, sharing on the basis of 
collection in such cases would lead to a very skewed distribution of the transfers.  
The apportionment problem also arises in the context of the income tax collected 
from corporate entities.  Collections accrue from head offices of companies which 
are concentrated in a few locations in the country while profits are effectively 
realised from sales all over the country.  Here again, revenue transfers on the basis of 
collection would lead to biased allocations.  The only taxes which can possibly be 
shared on the basis of collection are personal income tax, general sales tax on 
domestic production of goods and services and excise duties.  In the case of sales tax 
excise duties, there could be some concern about the tax exporting of the burden to 
other jurisdictions.  If the criterion of collection is to be used for allocation to 
districts then it would be necessary to ensure that CBR is able to provide information 
on collections at the district level.  This would require that there be a mapping of the 
CBR circle, commissionerate and collectorate boundaries to district jurisdictions. 
Beyond population, the other criterion that could be used for allocation of 
revenues to districts from the provincial divisible pool is pre-devolution expenditure 
on transferred services. This would have to be based on the aggregation of district 
level budgets of provincial line departments performing functions which will be 
transferred to local governments as part of the devolution plan (see the earlier section 
on allocation of functions).  The merit of inclusion of this criterion is that it will at 
least partly ensure that districtwise presence of facilities like schools, hospitals, 
roads, etc., is reflected in funds transferred so that there continues to be the ability to 
finance the operation of these facilities.  Of course, it is likely that this criterion is 
likely to confer some differential advantage to the more developed districts which 
are endowed with more public infrastructure and facilities. 
Another criterion which ought to be included because it enables a degree of 
fiscal equalisation is the extent of backwardness.  The NRB devolution plan has 
rightly emphasised the need for such transfers in order to reflect the relatively limited 
fiscal capacity for own revenue generation in the less developed areas.  The issues 
then will be of how fiscal capacity or the level of backwardness is to be measured 
and how funds for fiscal equalisation should be allocated.  There is no tradition in 
Pakistan of measuring districtwise value added in key sectors like agriculture or 
manufacturing and available socioeconomic indicators at the district level are few in 
number and generally out of date.  Fortunately, the population census has been 
conducted recently and a composite indicator of backwardness of districts can be 
constructed from the census and other data which could include measures like the 
extent of urbanisation, literacy rate, coverage of potable drinking water, school 
enrolment rates, etc.  As far as allocation of fiscal equalisation funds is concerned, Devolution and Fiscal Decentralisation 
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the Indonesian approach, which is simple, may be adopted.  Districts within a 
province which are declared ‘backward’, on the basis of some criteria, could become 
eligible for a special grant linked to the size of population. 
In summary, the issue of the extent and nature of revenue sharing transfers to 
finance the fiscal decentralisation to local governments remains a complex issue 
which will have to be grappled with by the PFCs.  Fundamental decisions will have 
to be taken with regard to, first, whether the divisible pool should remain restricted 
only to some or all provincial taxes or be extended to include NFC mandated 
transfers from the federal level to the provinces, second, what the combined share of 
the district governments should be in this divisible pool, and, third, whether the 
allocation should be simple and linked only to population or also include other 
criteria like collection, pre-devolution expenditures on transferred services, level of 
backwardness, etc.  If, in fact, the PFCs opt for a restricted divisible pool consisting 
only of some or all provincial taxes then grants will have to act as the major 
mechanism for financing the devolution of functions to local governments.  We turn 
to the issues related to the design of grants in the next section. 
 
8.  GRANTS 
In the devolution plan the underlying thinking of NRB appears to be 
somewhat tilted in favour of grants.  The question then arises as to which type of 
grant schemes should be established.  Broadly speaking, grants can be classified into 
three key categories.  The first is a selective or specific grant.  This type of grant is 
given for a particular purpose or to be spent on a specific service.  It is best suited for 
subsidising activities considered high priority by the higher level of government but 
low priority by local governments.  However, it has the disadvantage of limiting 
local autonomy by not allowing the money to be spent according to local 
preferences.  It can also lead to overexpenditure (in relation to local preferences or 
needs) on subsidised services.  The second type of grant is an unconditional or 
general grant.  This is like a block transfer to be spent according to local 
preferences, allowing maximum flexibility to the recipient government.  Because it 
augments local resource availability, this type of grant is like general revenue-
sharing transfers.  The danger here is that such a transfer induces local governments 
to underutilise their own tax bases.  The third type is a matching grant which can be 
either specific or general purpose and requires local governments to match the funds 
to some degree.  Though this type of grant encourages local resource mobilisation, 
its biggest disadvantage is that given the greater ability to generate funds, it favours 
richer jurisdictions and tends to exacerbate prevailing inequities across regions. 
A number of criteria have been identified for evaluation of inter-governmental 
transfers based largely on grants.  The first criteria is that of autonomy.  Ideally, 
transfers should honour the independence of recipient governments in setting their 
own priorities.  The second criterion is one of revenue adequacy.  Transfers should Pasha and Pasha 
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be adequate to the extent possible to cover both vertical and horizontal imbalances of 
local governments.  Equity is the third criterion, whereby grants should vary directly 
with fiscal need and inversely with the taxable capacity of a local jurisdiction. The 
fourth criterion is one of predictability.  Local governments should be able to 
forecast the quantum of inflow of funds with reasonable accuracy so that they can 
plan with some degree at certainty.  According to the fifth criterion of simplicity, a 
subnational government’s allocation should be based on objective factors over which 
individual units have little control.  In other words, ‘grantsmanship’ must be 
discouraged.  A grants scheme linked, for example, to the size of revenue deficits 
runs the risk of creating perverse incentives for raising expenditures and reducing 
own revenues in order to qualify for larger grants.  Therefore, we have the final 
criterion of appropriate incentives, whereby transfers should promote sound fiscal 
management. 
Indonesia represents a useful case study, with regard to the design of grant 
schemes.  In Indonesia, local governments receive general purpose transfers which 
are formula based.  District development grants have two components: a minimum 
grant for each government and a per capita grant.  Village development grants of an 
equal amount are given to each village, while villages in less developed areas get an 
additional per capita grant.  The second type of transfers in Indonesia is specific 
purpose transfers of the non-matching variety.  Such grants to local governments are 
meant to cover establishment costs, road improvement, expenditures on primary 
schools and health services.  Each type of grant is formula based.  For example, road 
improvement grants are linked to length and condition of roads, road density and unit 
costs. 
It appears that Indonesia has developed a simple, transparent and formula-
driven grants system which ensures minimum standards of provision at all locations 
by the incorporation of fiscal equalisation criteria.  This system can perhaps be 
replicated in countries like Pakistan where responsibilities are being transferred to 
local governments.  The PFC may develop suitable formulae for specific transfers to 
defray the operations and maintenance costs of the major services transferred to local 
governments.  Key decisions with regard to the design of such transfers will relate to 
the desired service standards and the target for local cost recovery from user charges. 
The simplest way  to build in fiscal equalisation in this regime will be to 
specify minimum standards of service provision.  Local governments in regions 
which are underserviced can thereby get additional development grants for 
expansion of such services.  Also, as emphasised earlier, it is important that grants to 
local governments are routed through provincial governments.  The only exception, 
with direct funding by federal government to local governments, could be in the case 
of special programmes like the Prime Minister’s/Chief Executive’s Mass Literacy 
Programme. 
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9.  BORROWING POWERS 
The degree of access to borrowings by subnational governments is one of the 
key issues in the context of fiscal decentralisation.  This depends on whether such 
governments should face a relatively ‘hard’ budget constraint or not.  It is important 
also in determining whether the process of decentralisation is likely to preserve 
macroeconomic instability or not, depending upon the magnitude of unregulated 
borrowings by local governments which can hinder the operation, in particular, of 
monetary policy. The NRB devolution plan has essentially precluded market 
borrowing in the short run by local governments. 
Internationally, local governments generally have limited access to 
borrowings.  In India, for example, state and local governments face a relatively hard 
budget constraint with severe limitations on direct access to capital markets, both 
domestic and external. This has spared the country from moral hazard and 
macroeconomic crisis witnessed in some federated states of Latin America, many of 
which were triggered by excessive state and local borrowings with implicit central 
government guarantees. 
In Pakistan, provincial governments essentially borrow on a long-term basis, 
at near market rates, from the federal government and float only limited market 
loans.  Local governments have seldom accessed the capital market in Pakistan.  In 
practice, governments have recourse to running overdraft facilities with the State 
Bank of Pakistan.  While there are well-defined limits imposed on the use of cash 
balances with the central bank these are frequently violated.  The central bank has 
found it difficult to dishonour cheques issued by subnational governments, which 
generally involve payment of salaries of government employees, due to the fear of 
agitation by a large number of people employed by such governments.  The prospect 
of an inevitable ‘bail out’ has created a kind of moral hazard problem. 
It, therefore, appears that in the interest of preserving macroeconomic stability 
borrowing powers of the local governments will have to be severely restricted.   
While access to capital markets is ruled out in the short run, use of overdraft 
facilities with the banking system should also be tightly regulated.  However, a 
window may be opened for financing remunerative projects at the local level by the 
establishment of a Municipal Development Fund by provincial governments with 
near-market rates of interest. 
 
 
10.  ALTERNATIVE SCHEMES OF FISCAL DECENTRALISATION 
We are finally in a position to identify on the basis of the discussion in the 
previous sections different approaches to fiscal decentralisation that can be adopted 
to finance the functions allocated to local governments in the NRB or Bengali (2000) 
devolution plan. It appears that there are basically two approaches which have Pasha and Pasha 
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fundamentally different implications for the financial autonomy of local 
governments.  The first approach is one which maximises local autonomy by 
reassigning taxes to the extent possible (in terms of whether the tax base is mobile or 
not) to local governments including possibly some powers to levy surcharges on 
taxes of higher levels of government and combines this with revenue sharing 
transfers or block grants which do not impose any conditionalities on the type and 
level of expenditures by local governments. If revenue sharing transfers is the 
preferred financing mechanism in this approach then the provincial divisible pool to 
be shared with district governments will not only have to include most, if not all, 
provincial taxes but also the funds received as federal transfers to the provinces from 
the federal divisible pool.  A likely ranking of the size of different financing 




* of Different Types of Financing Mechanisms
** in Alternative 
Schemes for Fiscal Decentralisation 
Alternative I 
(with greater local fiscal autonomy) 
Alternative II 
(with less fiscal autonomy) 
1. General Revenue-Sharing Transfers 
(including fiscal equalisation transfers) 
1. Specific Transfers 
2. Non-tax Revenues from Transferred 
Services 
2. Specific Development Grants 
(including fiscal equalisation 
transfers) 
3. Tax Revenues from Reassigned Taxes  3. Non-tax Revenues from Transferred 
Services 
  4. General Revenue-sharing Transfers 
  5. Tax Revenues from Reassigned 
Taxes 
   *In terms of size. 
**Existing tax and non-tax revenues + octroi/zila tax grants are to be used for the O&M and development 
of existing services. 
 
It needs to be recognised, however, that given the unprecedented magnitude of 
fiscal decentralisation to local governments that is proposed in the devolution plan, 
which in rupee terms amounts to almost Rs 90 billion, there may be need to properly 
manage the process of transition to avoid large-scale disruptions in the provision of 
basic services. 
If transfers for increasing the availability of funds with local governments are 
general in character than it is possible that the pattern of expenditures undertaken by 
local governments could differ widely from the existing priorities of provincial Devolution and Fiscal Decentralisation 
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governments.  This is clearly one of the benefits of devolution in that the changed 
priorities may more accurately reflect the needs and preferences at the local level.  
But it creates the hazard that there may be expenditure cutbacks in the financing of 
operations and maintenance of existing facilities and the savings diverted to 
financing development in areas having higher priority.  For example, a city 
government may decide to reduce allocations for public schools, given the presence 
of a strong private sector, and use the funds saved for development of trunk 
infrastructure for, say, water supply and urban transport.  This will imply closing 
down of a number of existing government primary and secondary schools and lead to 
redundancies in employment.  Are we prepared in the short run to let this happen and 
honour fully the different expenditure preferences of locally elected representatives? 
The other diametrically opposed approach to fiscal decentralisation is one 
which minimises the problems of transition and as indicated in the NRB plan creates 
financing mechanisms whereby the present district budgets of provincial line 
departments become, more or less, the budgets of the corresponding departments of 
local governments following implementation of the devolution plan.  This implies 
that greatest reliance will be placed on specific transfers to finance both current and 
development expenditures.  The consequence will be that in the short run there will 
be minimal change in expenditure priorities, which will largely ensure that there are 
no dislocations in the provision of services by the existing infrastructure and 
facilities.  However, it needs to be recognised that this approach essentially preserves 
the  status quo and restricts the flexibility of the newly constituted district 
governments in influencing the process of economic and social development in their 
respective jurisdictions. 
On the balance, we are inclined to prefer the first approach of ensuring that 
the nature of fiscal decentralisation is such as to preserve the maximum financial 
autonomy of local governments.  Pakistan is about to embark on a major social and 
political experiment of carrying decision making and provision of services to the 
grass roots level through implementation of the bold and ambitious devolution plan.  
As such, institutional and financial arrangements must be consistent with the 
enabling the third tier of government to truly manifest itself in terms of catering to 
the needs of the people and organising the provision of services in a more cost 
effective and sustainable manner. 
 
11.  TERMS OF REFERENCE OF PROVINCIAL  
FINANCE COMMISSIONS 
To ensure financial sustainability and effective operations of local 
governments in the country following the implementation of the devolution plan, the 
PFCs will have to study and make recommendations on the following: 
  (1) Which taxes, that are currently being levied and collected by provincial 
governments, should be handed over local governments? Pasha and Pasha 
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  (2)  Which taxes should be shared between the provincial and the local 
governments? Specifically, whether the divisible pool should remain 
restricted only to some or all provincial taxes or be extended to include 
NFC mandated transfers from the federal government to the provinces? 
  (3)  What should be the respective shares of the provincial and local 
governments in the divisible pool? 
  (4)  What should be the criteria for distribution of revenues among local 
governments? Should the allocation be simple and linked only to 
population or also include other criteria like collection, pre-devolution 
expenditures on transferred services, level of backwardness, etc.? 
  (5) To what extent should grants-in-aid be used to finance local expenditures?  
What type of a grants scheme should be established?  Which functions 
should be financed by grants?  What should be the target levels of local 
cost recovery in different services? 
  (6) What should be the mechanism of intra-district fiscal transfers? 
The PFCs should ideally be staffed by retired members of the higher judiciary, 
public finance experts and representatives from civil society.  In order to avoid any 
political victimisation of particular local governments through withholding of grants, 
the Secretariat of the PFCs should be charged with the task of routinely distributing 
grants on the basis of the prescribed formula to all the district governments within a 
province.  The provincial governments should remit the overall grant in advance on a 
quarterly basis to the PFCs for onward distribution. 
Also, the PFCs will require a districtwise database on which to base their 
awards.  For example, data will be required for each district on local revenues and 
expenditures, presence of facilities (like schools, RHCs, hospitals, roads, etc.), 
collection of provincial taxes, provincial line department expenditures and non-tax 
revenues.  In addition, to determine the need for fiscal equalisation, other indicators 
of social and economic development will need to be constructed at the district level.  
Compilation of this data should commence on a priority basis as work preparatory to 
the constitution of the PFCs. 
 
12.  CONCLUSIONS 
The NRB Devolution Plan involves substantial fiscal decentralisation to local 
governments, which is unprecedented in the history of Pakistan.  Almost Rs 90 
billion (equivalent to almost three per cent of GDP) of expenditure will to transferred 
from provincial to local budgets making them comparable in size and increasing the 
outlays by local governments to almost four times their present level.  This 
devolution will see the transformation of provincial governments from the role of 
direct provision to that of financing, regulation and monitoring and the emergence of 
local governments as the prime delivery agents of services and a key player in the Devolution and Fiscal Decentralisation 
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process of regional development.  Institutional capacity of local governments will 
have to be enhanced to perform these functions adequately. 
Given the magnitude of fiscal decentralisation, relatively complex financial 
arrangements will have to be put in place to finance this process.  Enhancement of 
local fiscal powers is expected to make only a minor contribution.  The rest of the 
finances will have to be organised through a system of inter-governmental transfers, 
ranging from general revenue-sharing mechanisms to specific purpose and fiscal 
equalisation grants.  The mix of these transfers, which will be decided by the PFCs, 
will depend upon the extent it is proposed to grant local fiscal autonomy. The paper 
recommends resort to general, unconditional and formula-driven transfers to the 
extent possible to give the newly formed district governments an opportunity to 
prove their ability to reflect local needs and preferences better and organise the 
provision of services in a more cost effective and sustainable manner. 
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It is well-known that poor state of governance and lack of transparency in 
government’s decision-making have been the two critical problems of Pakistan’s 
economy. The deteriorating state of governance accentuated macroeconomic 
imbalances, constrained Pakistan’s economic growth, and contributed to low investor 
confidence. Governance problems have severely reduced the effectiveness of public 
expenditures, contributed to tax evasion and loan defaults, even the accumulation of 
arrears in payment of utility bills. Lack of transparency in the government’s 
decision-making has resulted in high levels of corruption.  
The government has taken the issue of governance and transparency very 
seriously and therefore, measures aimed at improving governance and enhancing 
transparency constitute a key element of the reform agenda of the present 
government. These include among others: 
  (i)  The formulation of a Devolution Plan to redistribute the balance of 
activities and responsibilities across the various tiers of government; and  
  (ii) Measures to enhance the quality of public spending. 
The purpose of Devolution Plan is to decentralise the delivery of government 
services and enhance the role of local citizen’s groups in setting priorities for 
government spending. The Devolution Plan also involves substantial fiscal 
decentralisation to local governments which is unprecedented in the history of 
Pakistan. 
The paper under review basically analyses the fiscal implications of the 
Devolution Plan. In so doing, it looks at various issues related to fiscal 
decentralisation; it describes the broad policy statements on fiscal decentralisation as 
given in the Devolution Plan; it examines the extent of resource transfers which will 
be required in this Devolution Plan and whether there exist such capacity to handle 
large resources at local level. It also provides alternative allocation of fiscal powers 
between provincial and local governments.  
The Devolution Plan extends the role of the Local Government by giving 
them more responsibilities. The services like IT, Commerce and Industry, law and 
order, environmental education and protection have been added to the list of 
responsibilities of the local government. The paper expresses its doubts whether the 
local government will have capabilities of handling such responsibilities. In the past, 
it has been observed that the local government could not discharge properly their 
existing responsibilities, therefore, how can they be able to perform with new 
responsibilities. Major problems faced by the local government in the past include: 
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  – Shortage of Resources; 
  – Inadequate Institutional Capacity; and 
  – Lack of trained manpower. 
Successive governments in the past are responsible for not strengthening the 
institution of local governments. If local government could not perform the 
responsibilities properly it was the governments in power which were responsible 
and not the institutions of the local government. The local government did not 
receive adequate funds; it remained suspended for most of the time during its tenure; 
its institutional capacity was not strengthened; and no serious efforts were made by 
the successive governments in the past to strengthen this institution. The present 
government is serious in strengthening the institution of local government, through 
the Devolution Plan. 
It is, however, true that the process of strengthening the institutional capacity 
of the local government will be gradual. Training manpower to take the existing as 
well as extended responsibilities will also take time. We have to be very careful in 
the transition phase This is a new experiment and we all want it to succeed. We have 
to see whether we move towards the Devolution Plan gradually or in one go. In other 
words, do we begin with existing list of responsibilities or we have to extend them at 
this stage. Or do we need to redefine the responsibilities with item like education, 
basic and rural health, hospitals, public safety, public works to begin with and 
gradually extend the responsibility as the capacity builds up. This has fiscal 
implication as well. For example, the current budget of local government with 
existing responsibilities is about Rs 40 billion in relation to provincial budgets of Rs 
225 billion—i.e. local government budget is 18 percent of the Provincial budgets. If 
we extend the responsibility as planned in the Devolution Plan then roughly Rs 90 
billion or 40 percent of the existing budget of the provincial governments has to be 
transferred to local governments and to that extent the provincial government 
budgets will have to be reduced. Therefore, the local government resources will 
increase to Rs 130 billion from the present level of Rs 40 billion—an increase of 225 
percent. We have to see whether with existing institutional capacity and quality of 
manpower of the local government can handle such a large resource transfer. 
Similarly, how can the Provincial Governments adjust themselves with depleted 
resources in very short period of time. These are practical difficulties and must be 
given a careful thought. The issue is of pace. Do we need to enhance responsibility 
gradually or in one go or even we begin with lower responsibility, consolidate them, 
enhance institutional capacity and then gradually enhance the list of responsibility.  
The paper has also raised a very pertinent issue, that is, the transfer of assets 
of the provincial governments to local governments. In the Devolution Plan, no 
mention is made about the liabilities of the line departments which will be 
transferred to local governments. My question to the chair is that in the Devolution Comments 
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Plan, whether the liabilities of the line departments will remain with the Provincial 
Governments? If yes! then how this will be built into the resources transfer formula 
between the Federal to Provincial and between Provincial to local government 
through Provincial Finance Commission. 
I have two questions on the paragraphs 5.1.6 of the Devolution Plan as quoted 
on page 5 of the paper under review: First, who is going to judge the fiscal needs of 
the area and second, who is going to judge/determine the fiscal capacity of the area? 
The paper is silent on these questions.  
It has been stated in the Devolution Plan that the government wants to 
strengthen the local government and also wants to provide fiscal autonomy. Fiscal 
autonomy is the key to the success of the local government. It is also clear that the 
degree of fiscal autonomy will depend as to how much the local government 
mobilises resources though local (own) taxes. The higher the resources mobilised 
through local/own sources the more autonomous will be the local government. Thus, 
larger responsibilities will require more resources, therefore, given the existing tax 
bases of the local government they will have to rely heavily on provincial 
governments for resource transfers, and grants from the federal government. To that 
extent their fiscal autonomy will be compromised. Therefore, we have to look at the 
pace of increasing responsibility very carefully. Fiscal power of the local 
government should be defined clearly otherwise this will lead to the problem of 
multiplicity of taxes. This point has been raised in the paper.  
While elimination of Octroi and local export taxes in 1999-2000 was a right 
move in terms of reducing impediments to the private sector development, roughly 
60 percent of the Local Government revenue was lost. Although the revenue loss is 
being offset in the short run by a special transfer from the federal government, we 
need to have a sustainable solution over the longer run. 
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